Nortel Networks Nortel Network VPN Router and Client Workstation 7.05 - Manual (Page 17)

Security Target, Version 3.9 March 18, 2008
Nortel VPN Router v7.05 and Client Workstation v7.11 Page 17 of 67
© 2008 Nortel Networks
Attackers who are not TOE users: These attackers have no knowledge of how the TOE operates and are
assumed to possess a low skill level, a low level of motivation, limited resources to alter TOE configuration
settings/parameters, and no physical access to the TOE.
TOE users: These attackers have extensive knowledge of how the TOE operates and are assumed to
possess a high skill level, moderate resources to alter TOE configuration settings/parameters, and physical
access to the TOE, but no motivation to do so.
The threats are mitigated through the objectives identified in Section 4 - Security Objectives.
3.2.1 Threats Addressed by the TOE
The following threats are to be addressed by the TOE:
T.UNDETECT An attacker may gain undetected access due to missing, weak, and/or incorrectly
implemented access controls for the restricted files or TSF Data in order to cause
violations of integrity, confidentiality, or availability of the information protected by and
flowing through the TOE.
T.AUTH-ERROR An authorized user may accidentally alter the configuration of a policy that permits or
denies information flow through the TOE, thereby affecting the integrity of the transmitted
information.
T.DATA-MOD An attacker may intercept and alter the data transmitted between the Nortel VPN Client
and the Nortel VPN Router, and/or between two Nortel VPN Routers, in order to deceive
the intended recipient.
T. HACK-CRYPTO An attacker may successfully intercept and decrypt, then recover and modify the encrypted
data that is in transit between the Nortel VPN Router and VPN Client, and/or between two
Nortel VPN Routers.
T.HACK An attacker may use malformed IP packets or similar attack methods against the TSF or
user data protected by the TOE in order to corrupt normal operation.
3.2.2 Threats Addressed by the TOE Environment
The following threats are addressed by the TOE environment:
TE.PHYSICAL An attacker may physically attack the Hardware appliance in order to compromise its
secure operation.
TE.AUDIT_FAILURE An attacker may conduct an undetected attack on the information protected by the TOE
as a result of unreliable time stamps used by the audit mechanism, which may result in
failure to prevent further attacks using the same method.
TE.BAD_CERT An attacker may successfully authenticate to the VPN Router using a revoked, expired
or untrusted certificate in order to gain access to information residing on the private
network.