Security function strength rationale, Assurance measures rationale, Pp claim rationale – Konica Minolta BIZHUB 920 User Manual

Page 91: Pp claim rationle

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FMT_SMR.1

The maintenance of role is realized by realizing the registration of User BOX identifier and User

BOX password, and the change of CE, administrator, and User BOX passwords. The registration of

administrator, the registration of general user who owns User BOX, and the change of administrator,

CE, User BOX passwords, are implemented in IA.ADM_ADD, MNG.ADM, and IA.PASS

respectively. Therefore, FMT_SMR.1 is realized by implementing IA.ADM_ADD, IA.PASS, and

MNG.ADM.

FPT_STM.1

The function to create the audit record is realized in AUD.LOG. Therefore, FPT_STM.1 is

realized by implementing AUD.LOG.

FDP_MTD.1

The function to enter the HDD lock password is realized in MNG_HDD. Therefore, FDP_MTD.1

is realized by implementing MNG_HDD.

8.3.2. Security Function Strength Rationale

As described in “6.2 Security Function Strength”, SOF-Basic is claimed in the password

mechanism of the identification and authentication function (IA.ADM_AUTH, IA_CE_AUTH,

ACL_USR, IA_A M_AD , and IA.PASS) and management support function (MNG.ADM and

MNG_HDD). As described in “5.3 Security Strength”, the minimum function strength claims

SOF-Basic to security functional requirements and it is consistent with SOF-Basic claimed in “6.2

Security Function Strength”.

8.3.3. Assurance Measures Rationale

The assurance measures are corresponded to all of the TOE security assurance requirements

needed in EAL3 “6.3 Assurance Measures”. The all evidence that TOE security assurance

requirements regulated by this ST is covered by the related rules shown in the assurance measures.

Therefore, TOE security assurance requirements in EAL3 can be realized.

8.4.

PP Claim Rationale

There is no applicable PP in this ST.

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